Allen, C. (forthcoming) Intentionality: natural and
artificial.  In <I>Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science</i>,
J.A. Meyer and H.L. Roitblat (eds.) MIT Press
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<b>Abstract:</b>
What role should philosophical theories of intentionality play in
cognitive science?  Philosophers argue on conceptual grounds about the
appropriateness or inappropriateness of attributing intentional states
to animals, to computers, and even to humans.  I argue that a
comparative approach to cognitive science (CACS) allows cognitive
scientists to sidestep these disputes by treating philosophical
theories as starting points for empirical investigation.  For this
purpose, philosophical theories of intentionality are most useful when
they are naturalistic and not anthropocentric, and when they provide a
framework for empirical research that does not place a priori
constraints on what kinds of things can possess intentionality.  I
apply these criteria critically to recent philosophical views of
intentionality and I show how particular attention to the comparative
part of CACS should influence attempts to develop a theoretically
useful conception of intentionality.  In particular, this perspective
shows that insistence on defining intentionality prior to experimental
work is misguided; rather, an empirical, comparative approach to
refining the notion of intentionality should be attempted.  Finally, I
discuss the consequences of different conceptions of intentionality
for empirical work in ethology and artificial intelligence.