Allen, C. (1995) It isn't what you think: a new idea about intentional causation. Nous 29:115--126
Abstract

In this paper I analyze a standard argument for the conclusion that intentional properties are irrelevant to causal explanations of behavior. I then analyze an analogous argument for the conclusion that the property of genuineness is irrelevant to causal explanations of the effects that twenty-dollar bills have on human agents, and I indicate a way in which this argument fails. I then apply the lessons learned from the example of genuineness to articulate a defense for the causal relevance of intentional properties. The causal- irrelevance argument applied to intentional properties lacks a premise connecting a weaker possibility (that some brain states should have some particular behavioral effect while lacking the intentional property in question) to a stronger claim (that all those brain states should have the same behavioral effects while lacking the given intentional property). This premise could, I believe, only be supplied by empirical investigation, and it has not, as yet, been supplied. So, the argument does not provide a convincing demonstration that intentional properties are causally irrelevant to behavior. I end the paper by discussing several objections to this defense of the causal relevance of intentional properties.