Bekoff, M. and Allen, C. (forthcoming) Cognitive
ethology: slayers, skeptics, and proponents. In R.W. Mitchell, N.S.
Thompson, and H.L. Miles (eds.) Anthropomorphism, anecdotes, and
animals: The emperor's new clothes? SUNY Press
Abstract
As a relatively new interdisciplinary science, cognitive
ethology, broadly defined as the comparative and evolutionary study
of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) thought processes,
consciousness, beliefs, or rationality, is under attack with respect
to its scientific status. In this paper we identify three groups of
people with different views on cognitive ethology, slayers,
skeptics, and proponents. Our analyses are based on some
published reviews of Donald Griffin's works in cognitive ethology
and other clearly stated opinions concerning animal cognition.
Slayers deny that there have been, or even could be, any successes
in cognitive ethology because of the nature of the enterprise, its
supposed near total reliance on anecdote, folk psychological
explanations, and anthropomorphism. Skeptics share some of the
same concerns as slayers, but are more open-minded and patient.
Slayers and skeptics often claim that cognitive ethology only has a
future if it is consumed by experimental cognitive psychology or
neuroscience. Finally, proponents claim that there have been many
successes in the comparative study of animal cognition, and are
enthusiastic about the future of such investigations. Proponents
argue that folk psychological explanations, anecdotes, and
anthropomorphism can be integrated with empirical data in a
rigorous fashion. We were especially surprised by the number and
the strength of some of the attacks on cognitive ethology. Our
purpose here is to bring attention to those attacks and to try to
diagnose the sorts of arguments that underlie them. We are
concentrating on the critics because categorizing their various
motivations will allow those who are sympathetic to cognitive
ethology to recognize common themes and provide appropriate
responses.